The Welfare Effects of Pfiesteria-Related Fish Kills: A Contingent Behavior Analysis of Seafood Consumers by Parsons, George R. et al.
The Welfare Effects of Pfiesteria-Related 
Fish Kills: A Contingent Behavior 
Analysis of Seafood Consumers 
 
George R. Parsons, Ash Morgan, John C. Whitehead, and 
Timothy C. Haab 
 
  We use contingent behavior analysis to study the effects of pfiesteria-related fish kills on the 
demand for seafood in the Mid-Atlantic region. We estimate a set of demand difference mod-
els based on individual responses to questions about seafood consumption in the presence of 
fish kills and with different amounts of information provided about health risks. We use a ran-
dom-effects Tobit model to control for correlation across each observation and to account for 
censoring. We find that (i) pfiesteria-related fish kills have a significant negative effect on the 
demand for seafood even though the fish kills pose no known threat to consumers through sea-
food consumption, (ii) seafood consumers are not responsive to expert risk information de-
signed to reassure them that seafood is safe in the presence of a fish kill, and (iii) a mandatory 
seafood inspection program largely eliminates the welfare loss incurred due to misinformation. 
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Pfiesteria piscicida is a single-celled microor-
ganism, a toxic dinoflagellate, found in the sedi-
ments of many estuaries in the Mid-Atlantic re-
gion of the United States. It has been identified as 
the cause of many fish kills in this region. Thou-
sands, even millions, of fish can die in a single 
kill. During periods of warm weather and high 
nutrient concentrations, pfiesteria becomes a toxic 
predator to certain species of fish. While the sci-
entific evidence suggests that these outbreaks are 
lethal to the fish, it also suggests that they pose no 
health risk to humans in the seafood market.
1  
Nevertheless, media coverage of pfiesteria-related 
fish kills has led to rather large reductions in sea-
food consumption during periods of an outbreak. 
The associated loss in economic welfare is poten-
tially quite large and is seemingly due to misin-
formation. 
  In this paper we measure the welfare effects of 
a hypothetical pfiesteria outbreak using contin-
gent behavior analysis in a seafood demand model. 
We also consider the effects of different forms of 
information provision on attenuating the losses 
due to misinformation. Identifying the forms of 
information provision that have the largest posi-
tive impact on consumer behavior will provide 
important policy-based information for related 
government agencies and industry representatives 
seeking to reassure consumers of product safety 
and health concerns. Our research follows a frame-
work developed by Shulstad and Stoevener (1978), 
who measured the welfare losses incurred by Ore-
gon’s pheasant hunters in reaction to news of 
mercury contamination in pheasants. Since then, 
researchers have considered the impact of news-
induced health scares on the demand for a variety 
of goods. See, for example, Swartz and Strand 
(1981), Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thompson 
(1988), Brown and Schrader (1990), Wessells 
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and Anderson (1995), and Wessells, Miller, and 
Brooks (1995). Ours is the first to consider pfi-
esteria-related fish kills and the first to use con-
tingent behavior techniques to elicit consumers’ 
stated preferences in this context. We begin with 
a brief discussion of our survey and study design 
before turning to the model. 
 
Survey and Study Design 
 
Contingent behavior or stated preference tech-
niques are often used to measure consumer pref-
erences. Individuals are asked to respond to sur-
vey questions pertaining to a market or non-mar-
ket good. The provision of the good is altered in 
some fashion and the individuals are asked how 
they might respond to that change. In our case, 
respondents are asked how their seafood con-
sumption might change in the presence of a pfi-
esteria-related fish kill. 
  We conducted a phone-mail-phone survey of 
seafood consumers over the age of 18 in Dela-
ware, Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, and 
North Carolina in 2001. The sample frame was 
stratified based on a split between urban and rural 
areas and a split between North Carolina and the 
other four areas. Pfiesteria outbreaks are common 
in the Mid-Atlantic, and we had a particular inter-
est in North Carolina in our project. The goal was 
to conduct the survey during the fish kill season: 
June through November. The first phone survey 
was conducted from August to October. The sec-
ond phone survey was conducted from October to 
November. The mail portion of the survey was 
mailed out to individuals between the phone sur-
veys and contained information about pfiesteria. 
  Two focus groups were conducted to develop 
the pfiesteria information packet for mailing. The 
first focus group was conducted in Washington, 
North Carolina, and included five members of a 
local environmental organization. The second fo-
cus group was conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, 
with ten members of a church group. During each 
session, the facilitators presented sections of the 
information mailout and asked participants for their 
thoughts on what information they thought the 
text and visual aids conveyed. Overall, participants 
found the information straightforward. Where ap-
propriate, suggestions received during these ses-
sions were incorporated into the final version of 
the mailed information. 
  The survey questions were developed with in-
put from participants in an East Carolina Univer-
sity undergraduate environmental economics 
course and during 15 one-on-one (telephone and 
in-person) interviews. Participants in the one-on-
one interviews were chosen based on conven-
ience. These sessions focused on question word-
ing, organization, and skip patterns. Suggestions 
received during these sessions were incorporated 
into the final version of the questionnaires. 
  A pretest of 160 seafood consumers in Dela-
ware, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia was 
also conducted during June–July 2001. Frequency 
and statistical analyses of the pretest data re-
vealed no major flaws in the questionnaire. Only 
minor changes were made to the questions. 
  The first phone survey used random digit dial-
ing and screened people based on whether or not 
they ate seafood.
2 The survey was designed to 
collect information on seafood consumption pat-
terns, costs, knowledge of pfiesteria, and socio-
economic characteristics of respondents. In addi-
tion, each respondent was asked how his or her 
number of seafood meals consumed (monthly) 
would change if the price of seafood were to rise 
and to fall. The actual questions appear in Table 1 
as Questions 1 and 2. 
  Individuals were recruited in the initial phone 
survey to participate in a follow-up phone survey. 
Between phone calls, individuals were sent an 
information mailout
3 which included the follow-
ing: 
 
  ▪  a hypothetical press release describing a pfi-
esteria-related fish kill 
  ▪ information describing pfiesteria and its 
health risks 
  ▪ a two-sided color pamphlet describing a 
new seafood inspection program. 
 
  The press release described either a major or a 
minor kill. A major kill involved hundreds of 
thousands of fish over a large area of a river. A 
minor kill involved fewer fish over a smaller area. 
Each respondent received one or the other of 
these press releases split about equally across our 
sample. The fish kill was on the Neuse River in 
 
2 Seafood meals are defined as finfish or shellfish meals consumed at 
home or in a restaurant. Not included are canned seafood meals or sea-
food meals consumed at other people’s homes. Frozen seafood meals 
were eligible. 
3 Please contact the authors for copies of all the materials sent to 
respondents. 
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Table 1. Five Contingent Behavior Questions 
Question #  Wording 
Question 1: 
Price up 
Seafood prices change over time. For example, if a lot of fish are caught, prices go down. When fewer fish 
are caught, prices go up. Suppose the price of your portion of your average seafood meal goes up by $X but 
the price of all other foods stays the same. Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, do you 
think you would eat more, less, or the same number of meals next month with the higher price? (X is ran-
domly assigned $1, $3, $5, or $7) 
Then, 
About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you will eat next month? 
Question 2: 
Price down 
Now suppose the price of your average seafood meal goes down by $X, but the price of all other foods stays 
the same. Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, less, or 
the same number of meals next month with the lower price? (X is randomly assigned $1, $2, $3, or $4) 
Then, 
About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you would eat next month with the lower price? 
Question 3: 
Fish kill 
Thinking about seafood meals again, suppose that the average price of your seafood meals stays the same. 
Compared to the [NUMBER] meals you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, less, or the same 
number next month after the fish kill? 
Then, 
About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you would eat next month after the fish kill? 
Question 4: 
Fish kill with 
inspection 
Now suppose the average price of your seafood meals stays the same. Compared to the [NUMBER] meals 
you ate last month, do you think you would eat more, less, or the same number next month after the fish kill 
and with the mandatory seafood inspection program? 
Then, 
About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you would eat next month? 
Question 5: 
Fish kill with 
inspection and 
price increase  
Suppose that with the mandatory seafood inspection program the price of your portion of your average 
seafood meal goes up by $X, but the price of all other food stays the same. Compared to the [NUMBER] 
meals you ate last month, do you think that you would eat more, less, or the same number next month after 
the fish kill? (X is randomly assigned $1, $3, $5, or $7) 
Then, 
About how many more/less seafood meals do you think you would eat next month? 
 
North Carolina for North Carolina residents and 
on the Pocomoke River in Maryland for all oth-
ers. The respondents also received a map pin-
pointing the location of the event. 
  The information sent to respondents describing 
pfiesteria and its health risks came in three differ-
ent forms: (i) no information, (ii) a brochure, or 
(iii) a brochure and insert. Each respondent re-
ceived one or the other of these packets split 
about equally across our sample. The brochure 
explains what pfiesteria is and notes that the risks 
of eating seafood are not changed as a result of 
the fish kills related to pfiesteria outbreaks.
4 The 
insert is more direct and emphasizes that there is 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   
4 The brochure is based on a brochure published by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s Office of Water titled “What you should 
know about Pfiesteria Piscicida.” The brochure and insert information 
was simplified, shortened, and revised based on comments received 
from focus groups and from a review by an ecologist familiar with the 
pfiesteria scientific literature.  
no scientific evidence linking pfiesteria outbreaks 
to increased health risks in seafood consumption. 
Finally, each respondent was sent a short de-
scription of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (NOAA) voluntary seafood 
inspection program. 
  The second phone survey then focused on our 
next three contingent behavior questions: Ques-
tions 3, 4, and 5 in Table 1. Question 3 asked 
individuals how they would change their seafood 
consumption if the pfiesteria-related fish kill re-
ported in the press release were to occur.
5 Ques-
tion 4 asked the same question, but told respon-
dents to assume that the government safety in-
spection program described in the pamphlet was 
 
5 Respondents were asked prior to questioning in the second survey if 
they had read the brochure and/or the insert. If they had not, then they 
were asked if they were prepared to do so, and told that they would be 
called back at a later date, allowing them time to read the information.  
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in operation. Question 5 asked the same question 
but told respondents that the safety program was 
in operation and that the price of seafood would 
increase as a result. These questions were de-
signed to ascertain whether the seafood demand 
function shifted in the presence of a fish kill and 
if the inspection program attenuated that shift. 
The different treatments also allowed us to ex-
amine the extent to which demand shifts differ 
with different size fish kills and different infor-
mation provided about health risks. 
  The first phone survey generated a sample of 
1,790 respondents. The response rate was 61 per-
cent—completed interviews divided by contacts, 
where contacts include refusals and completed in-
terviews. Of these 1,790 respondents, 845 com-
pleted the second phone interview—a response 
rate of 47 percent. The mean annual income of 
our respondents was about $50,000, the mean age 
was 47, and the mean education level was 2 years 
beyond high school. Thirty-six percent were male 
and 71 percent were white. All statistics are 




We treat a pfiesteria-related fish kill as a factor 
affecting an individual’s perception of the health 
risks associated with consuming fish. That per-
ception, in turn, affects the individual’s demand 
for seafood meals. In our analysis a seafood con-
sumer has an indirect utility function over a fixed 
time period of the form v = v(p,q,y,h(s); c), where 
p is the price of a seafood meal, q is the price of a 
composite of all other goods, y is income for the 
relevant time period, h is the perceived quality of 
seafood, s is a vector of attributes that govern an 
individual’s perception of quality, and c is a vec-
tor of individual characteristics accounting for 
heterogeneity of the population. Following con-
ventional consumer theory, we expect (∂v/∂p) < 0, 
(∂v/∂q) < 0, (∂v/∂y) > 0, and   ≥ 
or  ≤ 0. The term s
(/) (/ ) i vh hs ∂∂⋅ ∂∂
i is one of i elements in the 
vector s. The elements can affect perceived health 
risks positively or negatively, and in our applica-
tion will pertain to the hypothetical pfiesteria-
related fish kill and information on the health 
risks associated with a kill presented in our con-
tingent behavior question. 
  Roy’s Identity implies an uncompensated de-
mand function for seafood meals of the form 
(/) / (/) ( , , , ( ) ; ) vp vy x p q y h − ∂∂ ∂∂= sc. In our appli-
cation we use linear forms for h(s) and 
x(p,q,y,h(s);c) to estimate seafood demand and 
the impact of fish kills on demand. 
  First, consider the contingent behavior ques-
tions for a change in the price of seafood. Indi-
viduals are asked how much their quantity de-
manded would change with a hypothetical change 
in price. Let ∆x be the reported change in the 
quantity demanded and ∆p be the size of the 
hypothetical price change. 
  In our demand model, 
 
(1)  0 pqyh xp y q ′ =β +β β +β + ′ + c β α sc  
 
is the demand at the current price p, and h(s) = 
α′s. Similarly, 
 
(2)  1 () pq y h xp p y q ′ =β +∆ +β β +β + ′ + c β α sc  
 
is the demand at the new price . Subtract-




(3)  p x p ∆ =β ∆ , 
 
where ∆x = x1 – x0 is the reported change in the 
quantity consumed in response to the hypothetical 
price increase. The term  ()() qy qq yy β −+ β −+  
 +  h ′ ′ β c α (s-s) α (c-c)  drops out of the demand dif-
ference by design. In the contingent behavior ques-
tion there is no variation in income, other prices, 
risk factors, or individual characteristics between 
the current state and the hypothetical state. 
  In our application we estimate βp using equa-
tion (3). Variation in price comes from the survey 
design—individuals receive different ∆p’s in the 
contingent behavior questions. For a price increase, 
∆p takes on a value of $1, $3, $5, or $7. For a 
price decrease, it takes on a value of -$1, -$2, -$3, 
or -$4 (see Questions 1 and 2 in Table 1).  
  We  estimated  separate equations for price-up 
and price-down. These are 
 
(4)    11
22
      
.
Qp u u p Q
Qp d d o w n Q
xp
xp
∆= β ∆+ ε
∆= β ∆ + ε
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The method is the same for estimating shifts in 
demand due to the fish kill analyzed in the last 
three contingent behavior questions. In this case, 
(5)  1 pqyh xp y q ′ =β +β β +β + ′ + c s+∆s) β α (c  
is the demand with the hypothetical fish kill and 
∆s is a vector of the change in the factors that af-
fect perceptions of risk. Subtracting equation (1) 
from equation (5) gives 
(6)  .  h x ∆= β ′ s α∆
∆x = x1 – x0 is the reported change in the quantity 
consumed in response to the hypothetical fish kill, 
and  βp(p–p)+βq(q–q)+βy(y–y)+β′c(c–c) drops 
out of the demand difference since there is no 
change in p, q, y, and c between the current and 
hypothetical states in the contingent behavior 
question. Some elements in s, however, do change 
by design, which gives rise to the specification in 
equation (6). 
  Now, consider Question 3 in Table 1. Individu-
als face either a major or a minor fish kill and are 
given one of three levels of information: (i) no in-
formation, (ii) a brochure, or (iii) a brochure and 
an insert. This gives the following form of our 
demand difference 






















where the right-hand side variables are our ∆s’s. 
We have major-kill (= 1 if kill is major), minor-
kill (= 1 if the kill is minor), brochure (= 1 if re-
spondent received brochure), and brochure & 
insert (= 1 if respondent received brochure and an 
insert). 
  The coefficients on major-kill and minor-kill 
are expected to be negative. The hypothesis is 
that individuals have misperceptions about the 
dangers of seafood consumption—believing it is 
dangerous to eat after a pfiesteria-related fish kill 
when in fact the danger is slight. The coefficients 
on brochure and brochure & insert are expected 
to be positive—information on risk shifts demand 
“back” to the right. The hypothesis is that the 
safety information counters the misperception of 
seafood health risks and reduces the extent of the 
leftward shift. The latter is a recovery of lost wel-
fare due to poor information. 
  In Question 4, everyone is asked how his or her 
response to Question 3 would differ if a seafood 
inspection program had been in place. Question 5 
is the same as 4 except that individuals are told 
that the inspection program will increase the price. 
The price increase was $1, $3, $5, or $7. 

















































brochure & insert + 
inspection













    
where inspection equals 1 if the inspection pro-
gram is in place, and price for inspection equals 
the price increase per seafood meal due to pro-
gram. 
  Introduction of a seafood inspection program, 
inspection, would presumably work to shift de-
mand “back” to the right—we expect a positive 
coefficient. The price for inspection should 
dampen the extent of the rightward shift since 
consumers realize they have to pay for the pro-
gram—we expect a negative coefficient. 
  We estimate equations (4), (7), (8), and (9) si-
multaneously as a linear model with eight pa-
rameters.
6 Simultaneous estimation allows us to 
constrain parameters across equations to be con-
stant and to estimate the model with random ef-
fects. Random effects allow the error terms in the 
model to be correlated across equations for each 
observation. It stands to reason that the same un-
observed elements that influence an individual’s 
shift in demand due to a fish kill without an in-
spection program will also influence that indi-
                                                                                    
6 The eight parameters are βpu, βpd, and βhα1 through βhα6. Since the 
individual parameters βh and αi are not identified in our model, we 
estimate βhαi as a single parameter for each i. This has no bearing on 
our final welfare calculations. 
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vidual’s shift with an inspection program in place. 
Since all observations in the sample do not make 
it to the second survey and since there is some 
attrition due to simple cleaning of the data, an 
unbalanced version of a random effects model is 
estimated. 
have a brochure and an insert, (iv) an inspection 
program is in place, and (v) an inspection pro-
gram is in place and there is a price rise.
9
  There are several noteworthy findings. First, 
the effects of a price increase and a price decrease 
differ—the slope of the demand function is larger 
for a decrease than for an increase. The coeffi-
cient on ∆pdown is -.346, and the coefficient on 
∆pup is -.218. At the mean, this is a price elastic-
ity of demand of .78 for a price decrease and .49 
for a price increase. In effect, there is a “kink” in 
the demand function at the point of current 
consumption. Quantity demanded seems to be 
more responsive to a price decrease than a price 
increase. This finding appears to be consistent 
with theories of loss aversion—that individuals 
value losses more highly than gains of equivalent 
magnitude. One may be inclined to argue that this 
is due to individuals’ inability to reduce con-
sumption beyond their current level, thereby cap-
ping the response to price increases. However, 
keep in mind that we have estimated a version of 
the model that accounts for truncation at current 
consumption. 
  The model is also estimated as a Tobit regres-
sion with censoring at –x, the negative of the 
quantity consumed. This is because individuals 
cannot reduce their consumption of fish by more 
than the quantity consumed. Since individuals con-
sume different quantities, the censoring point var-
ies across observations.
7
  Finally, we use the estimated model to report 
the change in consumer surplus due to hypotheti-
cal major and minor fish kills. This surplus loss is 
sometimes called “avoidance cost.” It is the loss 
associated with avoiding fish consumption when 
in reality fish is safe to eat. It is the difference in 
an individual’s consumer surplus with and with-
out a fish kill. In the linear demand model, an in-
dividual’s loss is {(x+∆x)
2–x
2}/–2βp, where x is 
reported monthly consumption, ∆x is the reported 
change due to a fish kill, and βp is from the esti-
mated model. We report these losses under differ-
ent assumptions about information provision.
8   Second, the coefficients on major-kill and 
minor-kill are negative and significant as ex-
pected. This general result is supported by other 
studies [see Anderson and Anderson (1991) or 
Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava (2000)]. What 
is unexpected is that the effect of a major kill and 
a minor kill are about the same. There is no sta-
tistical difference in their coefficients. The impli-
cation is that the size and scope of a fish kill is 





The regression results appear in Table 2. These 
are random effects Tobit regressions with censor-
ing at the negative of the number of meals con-
sumed. Table 3 shows the change in surplus or 
avoidance cost due to minor and major fish kills 
per seafood meal. We report surplus losses as-
suming that (i) individuals have no information, 
(ii) individuals have a brochure, (iii) individuals 
 
                                                                                    
9 Two caveats are worth noting here. First, since we question people 
about the number of seafood meals (and change in the number of sea-
food meals) consumed in a month, in a sense they have “recent” in-
formation about the kill for each meal in a month. Following an actual 
kill, an individual will have “recent” information for only a day or so, 
not a full month. If an individual’s reaction to information changes as 
time passes, our estimates will be biased. For example, a press release 
may have a large impact in only the first few days, its impact thereafter 
diminishing. Whether or not people mimic that type of behavior in our 
survey is uncertain. To the extent that there is decay in the effect of a 
fish kill on consumption of seafood over a month, we may be 
overstating the impact. Second, since we use a composite measure of 
seafood, we miss substitution across types of seafood that may occur as 
a result of a pfiesteria outbreak. For example, if a person changes the 
type of fish he or she eats in response to the outbreak but does not alter 
his or her total seafood consumption, there is a welfare loss. In our 
model, we would observe no change in seafood consumption and no 
welfare loss. In this respect, our analysis will understate welfare losses. 
7 There are a number of ways the model could have been more com-
plex econometrically. In principle, we have a difference of two count 
data variables for our dependent variable. This introduced a number of 
complications that make a simple count model (our first choice) for the 
demand differences infeasible: some of our differences are negative, 
the distribution of the difference of two count variables is not a simple 
count variable [see for example Consul (1989)], and we really have a 
difference of two censored variables at two points. The econometrics 
gets complicated and is not really sorted out in the literature as far as 
we can tell. Our purpose in this paper is to present a simple slice of the 
data using some basic econometric techniques. We think there are 
some interesting findings to share in this regard alone. 
8 We report welfare changes using the price-up coefficient, βpu, in 
equation (4) since all the measures of surplus we consider are inte-
grated over the portion of the demand curve corresponding to a price 
increase. 
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Table 2. Regression Results
a
  
Parameter Estimates for 
Equations 4, 7–9 
Variable   Coefficient  t-statistic 
∆pup Amount of price increase   -.218*  -13.7 
∆pdown Amount of price decrease  -.346*  -14.3 
major-kill  Dummy variable for major fish kill  -1.19*  -8.0 
minor-kill  Dummy variable for minor fish kill  -1.27*  -9.2 
brochure  Dummy variable for brochure included  -.089  -0.7 
brochure & insert  Dummy variable for information insert included  .076  0.6 
inspection  Dummy variable for inspection program in place  1.06*  8.0 
price for inspection  Amount of price increase due to seafood program  -.183*  -6.8 
Sigma(v)   2.14  197.7 
Sigma(u)   .191  1.5 
aRandom-effects Tobit model with censoring at the negative of the number of meals purchased per month and allowing for 
correlation across 5 contingent behavior questions. 




Table 3. Avoidance Cost Estimates Due to Fish 
Kill
a
   Average Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
per Meal 
Information Scenario  Major Kill  Minor Kill  
With no information  -$4.17 -$4.34 
With brochure  -$4.38 -$4.54 
With brochure & insert  -$4.20 -$4.37 
With inspection program  -$0.60 -$0.92 
With inspection program and 
$1 price increase in meals 
-$1.37 -$1.65 
a Average change in consumer surplus per meal per person for 




of dead fish signal an increase in health risk com-
parable to tens of thousands of dead fish.
10 The 
welfare loss associated with the fish kills, ignor-
ing for the moment the cases with information 
provision and inspection programs, is on the or-
der of $4 per meal. 
                                                                                    
10 One referee noted an alternative interpretation: perhaps our contin-
gent behavior survey failed to pass a scope test [see Hanemann (1994), 
p. 34]. 
  Third, information provision in the form of a 
brochure or a brochure along with an insert ap-
pears to have limited sway on consumers. The 
coefficients on brochure and brochure & insert 
are statistically insignificant. It follows that the 
welfare loss associated with the fish kills assum-
ing individuals have a brochure or have a bro-
chure and the insert is about the same as the cost 
with no information. This finding seems to sug-
gest that simply providing information based on 
experts’ judgments carries little weight in altering 
individuals’ perceptions. It is also possible that 
the manner in which the information was pack-
aged and presented was the cause for the limited 
impact—people ignored it or found that it lacked 
credibility. For example, the brochure is rather 
long and may simply be disregarded. Or, what 
was intended to make consumers feel safe may 
have inadvertently raised an issue they had not 
really considered before. For a discussion of the 
credibility of the sources of information, see Hov-
land and Weiss (1951), Sternthal, Phillips, and 
Dholakia (1978), Smith, Young, and Gibson 
(1999), Tse (1999), and Frewer, Scholdere, and 
Bredahl (2003). 
  These coefficients are consistent with the argu-
ment that positive information has less of an ef-
fect on consumer behavior than negative media 
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coverage. The “negative” press releases shifted 
demand significantly; the “positive” brochures 
shifted it only slightly. Kroloff (1988) found that 
the impact of media exposure gives negative 
news quadruple weight compared with positive 
news. Sherrell et al. (1985) calculated that it takes 
five times more positive information to offset the 
effects of any negative information. 
  Fourth, the presence of an inspection program, 
unlike information provision, shifts the demand 
function significantly rightward—returning it 
close to its pre-fish kill position. The coefficient 
on  inspection nearly perfectly offsets the initial 
shift due to the hypothetical fish kill. The coeffi-
cient is also statistically significant. This result is 
consistent with Wessells and Anderson (1995), 
who considered the role of a variety of measures 
of providing seafood safety assurances and found 
that consumers placed a high value on seafood 
inspection programs. So, the cost of the kill, with 
an inspection program in place, drops dramati-
cally, as shown in Table 3. The curious thing here 
is that inspection programs would discover noth-
ing related to pfiesteria that one could actually act 
upon to reduce risk, since pfiesteria poses no 
health threat to humans who consume infected 
seafood to begin with. In this regard a program 
may comfort consumers, but it would be a some-
what peculiar government response. 
  Fifth, the impact of a rise in seafood prices due 
to an inspection program is about the same as a 
general price rise—a sensible result. The coeffi-
cient on ∆pup is -.218 and on price of inspection is 
-.183. This has the potential of offsetting some of 
the recaptured losses due to the inspection pro-
gram. In Table 3 we present the welfare loss for a 
fish kill assuming an inspection program is in 




As expected, individuals react to fish kills by re-
ducing consumption of fish, even though the fish 
kill is unlikely to pose increased health risks. This 
result has been documented elsewhere in the 
literature and suggests that there may be a role for 
government in providing information to consum-
ers about risks. 
  When individuals reduce seafood consumption, 
they are said to incur avoidance costs—welfare 
loss associated with unnecessarily avoiding a 
desirable meal. The benefit of a government in-
formation program then is the avoidance cost 
saved by informing consumers. The avoidance 
costs in question appear to be rather large. Using 
our model, the aggregate cost over the four-state 
region is on the order of $60 million per month, 
depending on the amount of risk information pro-
vided to individuals. 
  We found that consumers were not responsive 
to “expert” risk information sent in a mail packet 
in the form of a brochure. The brochure empha-
sized that eating fish after a kill was safe. For the 
most part, individuals behaved as they would have 
without the information. The savings in avoid-
ance cost were small. Perhaps experts have little 
sway in how individuals form perceptions of risk. 
Or, perhaps our information packets and method 
of dissemination failed to communicate the risk 
meaningfully or individuals simply ignore the in-
formation. 
  On the other hand, we found that consumers 
were quite responsive to seafood inspection pro-
grams. Avoidance costs are nearly eliminated by 
the hypothetical inspection program used in our 
experiment. This suggests that consumers have 
confidence in such programs and that concrete 
action by government authorities can affect con-
sumer decisions. These results hold even though 
inspections programs, in principle, could discover 
nothing related to pfiesteria that one could actu-
ally act upon to reduce risk since pfiesteria poses 
no health threat in seafood. We also found that 
the gain in surplus realized by such programs can 
be easily dissipated if individuals believe the pro-
grams will lead to a rise, even a small rise, in the 
price of fish. 
  There were a number of other interesting find-
ings. Individuals did not seem to differentiate be-
tween major and minor size fish kills. We sur-
mised that there is some threshold level that trig-
gers a response by consumers and that our kills 
surpassed that threshold. We also found that the 
people responded asymmetrically to price in-
creases and price decreases—people were more 
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